Abstract-To address recently emerging concerns on privacy violations, this paper investigates possible sensitive information leakages in the appliance control, which is one of the handiest and most visible applications in smart grids. Without a consistent privacy preservation mechanism, the appliance control system can capture, model and divulge customers' behavior, activities, and personal information at almost every level of society. We investigated a privacy threat model for the appliance control application and further design and implement a protection protocol. Experiment results demonstrate that our protocol merely incurs a substantially light overhead on the appliance control application, but is able to address and solve the formidable challenges both customers and utility companies are facing.
INTRODUCTION
Smart grids, or the intelligent electricity grid have the potential to shave the power consumption peak, to optimize energy loss, to reduce customers' power bills, and to provide better power recovery capabilities. However, the digitized move to replace 'dumb' meters with smart meters implies an intrinsic link between electricity customers and ambient smart devices. Smart grids generate and archive highresolution smart data such as power consumptions, control commands, events, and alarms. These data can vividly demonstrate its owner's daily activities, individual behavior models and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) [24] , [28] . Its usability could potentially extend beyond its original purposes for which it is collected and stored.
The privacy violation in smart grids is a pressing challenge today and increasingly affects all of us given the fact that smart data can be misused to infer personal matters. Some pioneer studies, e.g., [28] , explore means to monitor major appliances in a dwelling by converting the power usage data into a timeline of appliance use. However, there has been little discussion of appliance control applications. Their privacy risks exist just as other human-objective operations involving personal data. Commands, for instance turning on/off a particular air conditioner or adjusting its thermostat settings can individualize the customer. Direct access to them can easily infer users' activity patterns such as occupancies of their residences. Furthermore, some uses of data maybe still unknown nowadays, however critical decades later hence. Ultimately, privacy protection schemes to hide appliance control commands and eliminate personal information are highly demanded. This paper takes the first step in exploring the privacy preservation for appliance control applications by investigating benefits from cryptographic methods.
Contributions:
 This paper, as the best of our knowledge, is the first to systematically study privacy leakages for the appliance control application. Furthermore, it is the first to practically enumerate detailed privacy threats.
 We develop and implement the fine-grained PrivacyPreserving Protocol (P3) through the usage of AttributeBased Encryption (ABE) system [12] , [6] . This protocol gives appliance control applications a chance to fully taking advantage of ABE's flexibility as appliances are controlled by easily-combined policy managements.
 This paper is the first to design and develop a practical appliance control system with the privacy preservation property via integrating P3. Diverse interaction means to control appliances are illustrated and how to protect privacy is demonstrated.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Appliance Control Examples
Controlling smart appliances e.g. air conditioners, pool pumps, dish wishers etc. by smart grids, cloud or a computer at home is not only possible but it is commonly found in smart home nowadays [2], [3] . Two examples describing the appliance control from different perspectives are listed: 1) Direct Load Control Program Demand Response (DR) programs aim to balance the supply and the load in real time. The Direct Load Control program is a classical one which enables utility companies to remotely shut down residence's appliances in a short notice with customers' prior consent [4] . The remotely controlled devices can be smart appliances such as air conditioners, water heaters, etc.
2) Remote Appliance Control Currently, some utility companies provide customers the capabilities to remotely control appliances through smart grids. The explicit human control is enabled by interactions between smart grids and smart phones or even e-mails. A person, for example, before leaving workplaces, can turn on air conditioners in his home. Then, once getting home, the person can relish the cool air. Another example is that some customers may forget to turn off the appliances e.g. pool pumpers, air conditioners, etc. in a hurry when leaving. They can turn off these appliances remotely for saving. 
B. Appliance Control Model
In smart grids, multicast is extensively deployed because of its scalability, its efficiency and its functionality across network segments [34] . Appliance control applications also take advantage of it for sake of efficiency. Furthermore, we assume that a residence has a smart meter installed at home. A residential address can be used to represent the smart meter which is identified by a carefully selected attribute set. For example, we used the following attributes in our application: { = "street number"; = "street name"; = "ZIP value"; = "city name"}. Therefore, when been associated with all four attributes each of which is assigned with a concrete value, a command can uniquely identify the particular smart meter . As depicted in Fig. 1 , the control server multicasts smart meters a command list which encapsulates the command . After receiving and recognizing that is designated for it, will execute . Then, responds the control server the result once available. Another example is that, when only three attributes (except = "street number") are assigned with concrete values for a command , all smart meters located in the particular street matching the attribute set. Each of them executes the command, .
C. Privacy Threat
In this paper, a privacy threat [30] , [32] , [21] occurs when an adversary can associate an appliance control command with personal information e.g. customers' private information, activity models, preferences, etc.
Privacy for residence occupancy: An appliance control command can let an adversary infer that the resident is presence or absence (also referred as absence privacy).
Example I: Alice sends a remote control command to ' ' aiming to shut down the air conditioner when the local temperature outdoor is high (e.g. 104°F/40°C). Eve can probably infer that residence with ' ' may possible be empty and then he can take the risk to break in.
Privacy for appliance ownership: The history of appliance control commands { } let an adversary compile a list of household appliances and surmise the lack one.
Example II: Alice had sent home the remote appliance control commands associated with heaters, dish washers or dryers but otherwise air conditioners. Eve extrapolates that it is highly possible for Alice to not own an air conditioner yet. The commercial information is valuable.
Privacy for personal activities model: The appliance control commands { } can let the adversary generalize the residence's activity model.
Example III: Alice always remotely turns on his air conditioner half an hour earlier before arriving at home. Eve finds that theses control commands are sent out at 5:30pm from every Tuesday to Thursday but, 6:30pm every Monday. Eve can draw Alice's life pattern in the future based on it.
D. Group key Scheme vs. Pairwise key vs. ABE
The appliance control application prefers to satisfy the DR requirements or control the appliances through a set of policies to manage the system. An example would be temporarily turning up the temperature settings at peak period for all air conditioners except those deployed in hospitals. Therefore, if all air conditioners are labeled with corresponding attributes, e.g. hospital and residential, at the key-issuing phase, the task can be easily achieved via sending out a command according to given policies. Hence, we require such privacy preservation mechanisms that demonstrate the flexibility to accommodate the policy.
Group Key Scheme: A pre-shared symmetric group key (e.g. [16] ) can be used to encrypt / decrypt multicast packets among all group members (e.g. smart devices). Its advantage is the secure, peer-to-peer data sharing but it is inflexible: to accommodate a policy, a Key Distribution Center (KDC) needs to enumerate all nodes matching the policy and then distribute partial keys / keys to each node in the list via secure channels. Smart meters need calculate the group key. Expensive overhead in terms of computation and communication incurs at both the server end and the smart meter end. Meanwhile, a new policy introduces more creations of groups which are merely reusable. Therefore, we argue that there are substantial barriers to fully realize it in collaboration with the appliance control in smart grids.
Pairwise key: The pairwise key scheme demonstrates that its rate of data throughput is high and its key length is relatively short. However, it lacks scalability for multicast communication. Furthermore, it raises complicated key management issues: 1) A number of key pairs should be managed in a large network which results in the mandatory deployment of an unconditionally trusted TTP (Trusted Third Party). 2) The frequency to refresh session keys is high -the worst case is that each communication session demands a new session key [25] . Hence, the key management of the pairwise key system requires expensive cost.
ABE: in the ABE system [12] , [6] , users are associated with various attributes. The publisher can encrypt the plaintext and the ciphertext can be decrypted by subscribers only when their attributes match the policy defined by the encryptor. Unlike other schemes at the coarse-grained level which give subscribers your private key (e.g. the pairwise key or the group key), ABE is fine-grained and it can establishes a specific access control policy on who can decrypt the data. This exactly satisfies the multicast service deployed in smart grids. However, ABE demands an expensive computational and communication cost. 
III. PROTOCOL, ARCHITECTURE AND APPLICATIONS
This section starts with investigating the adversary model and discussing the security assumption. This is followed by an innovative privacy protection mechanism, including a system overview to integrate smart grid devices with ABE, a protocol to conceal sensitive messages and a practical appliance control system to be taken as samples.
A. Adversary Model and Security Assumption
Adversary Model: like other researches in areas of privacy preservations [11] , [15] , [18] , [31] , we follow the semihonest adversary model in which smart devices (e.g. smart meters, etc.) obey appliance control schemes. Meanwhile they are also curious about messages they learn (or share) and have the intension to combine these information if possible. Therefore, any participating smart devices should relay packets and also intend to uncover others' privacy by studying sensitive messages received. Security Assumption: we assume that smart devices such as smart meters, etc. are tamper-resistant. Furthermore, we also assume the availability of PKI deployed in utilities [26] . Likewise, we assume that the control server holds its own private key and publishes its public key (e.g. RSA [25] ). Moreover, we assume that device attestations are deployed to validate smart meters, etc. Besides, our protocol mainly focuses on the confidentiality service to protect privacy. The authentication and integrity services guaranteed by digital signatures and one-way hash functions are also important but beyond our paper's scope.
B. System Overview
There are three participants in P3 system: smart meters installed in the customer residences; control servers and trusted Key Distribution Center (KDC) deployed in utility control centers. To protect multicast communication which sends crucial appliance control commands from the control server to multiple smart meters in P3 system, we adopt an ABE encryption system [12] , [6] (refer to Appendix B in [17] for details). To screen unicast communications which feedback results from the smart meter to the control server, we deploy the RSA public key encryption system for sake of computational efficiency. The KDC's responsibility is to issue ABE keys and RSA private/public key pairs to control servers and smart meters.
In P3, it is crucial that the control server can efficiently encrypt the commands by a policy written over attributes to accomplish specific appliance control tasks. Smart meters can decrypt ciphertext in an efficient manner if its private key reflects the set of attributes which exactly satisfy the policy specified by the ciphertext.
A detailed view about how P3 adopts the ABE cryptography system is illustrated in Fig. 2 : at setup ⓿ phase, ABE Public Key (PK) and ABE Master Secret Key (MSK) are generated by the trusted KDC deployed in the utility control center. The next step for every participant (e.g. smart meters, control servers) is to register ❶ with their own attribute sets. For example, a smart meter provides attributes: {street_number: 12345; street name: main street; ZIP: xyz; city: noname}. After that, following the successful authorization, the corresponding ABE Secret Key (SK) will be generated ❷ by KDC. Thereafter, every smart meter is issued ❸ SK of its own and the public key (PK) by KDC in a secure channel (e.g. physical touch or encrypted by the smart device's RSA public key). The control server receives the public keys (PK) via secured channels. Then, plaintext can be encrypted ❹ by the control server with the public keys (PK) and attribute sets, each of which represents an entry within the appliance control command list. The control server multicasts ciphertext to smart meters. Smart devices can decrypt ❺ the ciphertext if the reflecting attribute sets match with attributes of the smart grid. Furthemore, if a smart device is expired, its secret key should be revoked ❻. In general, a time stamp is appended to smart devices indicating expired dates. Refer to Appendix B in [17] for most detailed algorithms.
C. Protocol
The essential goal of P3 is to realize an efficient privacy preservation mechanism satisfying scalability and timecritical requirements of smart grids without any privacy exposures. P3 conceals sensitive data transferred in appliance control applications via integrating the ABE encryption and in conformance with regulations of smart grids.
Before the P3's execution, some pre-operations should be accomplished: the trusted KDC setups the public key (PK) and master key (MSK), registers attributes and calculates ABE secret key (SK) for all participates, e.g. smart meters. Each node is issued PK and its own SK. Refer to Appendix C in [17] for detailed algorithms of P3.
Our P3 is illuminated in Fig. 3 : the control server multicasts smart meters the appliance control command list, in which each command entry is encrypted by the ABE encryption algorithm with public key and command 's entry attributes . Each smart meter decrypts the ciphertext by using its own secret key if its own attributes matches with . After the decryption operation, executes the command entry . Then, encrypts the result with the control server's RSA public key and sends it back to the control server. The control server decrypts it with its RSA secret key for sake of efficiency.
As a security protocol, the command list transmitted in P3 requires not only confidentiality but authentication and integrity services. They can be supported by digital signature technology and one-way hash function [25] , [33] .
D. System Architecture of Appliance Control Application
In this subsection, we design and develop an appliance control system with privacy preserving services by utilizing P3 as the cornerstone. It is not only a practical application deployed in the smart grids but a concrete example demonstrating our P3's feasibility. The rest will focus on its two fundamental subsystems, (1) the Input system, (2) the Encode and Decode subsystems, as illustrated in Fig. 4 .
1) Input subsystem:
The input system generates and manages requests to control appliances. There are two sets of input sources: i) Manual. Requests can be released by authorized electricity customers via smart phones, web services, command line applications, etc. A customer, for instance, sends messages via smartphone to accomplish services e.g. turning off the air conditioner at his home. Smart phones, remote access or web services used here are for command input purpose. Their security can be guaranteed by telecommunication services, web/mobile security or security protocols which are mature and available on the market. ii) Automatic. The vast majority of requests are executed by the DR program such as Direct Load Control to multicast control commands.
2) Encode and Decode subsystems:
The Encode and Decode processes requests through three components: i) Parsing; ii) XML-based transforming; iii) Encryption and Decryption. The third one is almost the same as P3.
Meanwhile, the control center should also validate requests' authorization and verify their authentication, both of which will not be further described due to space limits.
Here, as illustrated in Fig. 4 , we provide an example to demonstrate how the three components cooperate with each other to accomplish the privacy shield task. Smart phone applications, for example, send out messages listed below to turn off an air conditioner: " Here, means appliances service, stands for the address, means the air conditioner and represents the shutdown command. Likewise, a web service may ask customers to fill out a form indicating such kinds of parameters. No matter how many formats utilized in the Input system, they all need to be parsed into a standardized format. Servers in utilities hosting Parsing component polls activated requests repeatedly. Hence, the set of attributes will be transformed into XML-based language. After that, it is a must to encrypt standardized appliance control commands via following ABE system. Now and then, the control server multicasts ciphertext immediately but most times, later, as scheduled. MNT elliptic curve of embedding degree 6 with order 160 bits length and base field order 512 bits length were utilized in P3. We collected ten times' (randomly selected number) executions of ABE operations at (a) -(d), including key setup, key generation, and encryption on a server as well as decryption at a smart meter. The number of attributes were ranging from 1 to 5 (randomly selected number). That of RSA public key encryption and decryption is at (e). The overall P3 performance cost is demonstrated in (f). As real smart meters do not allow executing a 3 rd party software (according to GE Company), the server and smart meter in the experiment were both virtual machines hosted by Oracle's VirtualBox installing Ubuntu 11.10. The detailed configuration of the server -Memory: 496MB; CPU 2.67GHz; Disk 7.9 GB. That of the smart meter -Memory: 64MB; CPU 333MHz, which is exactly the same configuration of an ARM Cortex 926EJS processor that, generally, is used to power a real smart meter.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In our application, the performance of Encode and Decode components at the client and the server ends respectively dominates that of P3. They are of importance. The running times of the Command Line, Smart Phone and Web application components and Parsing component are trivial. We will not further discuss their performance due to space limits. In this subsection, our emphasis specifically focuses on Encode and Decode components' performance. We implement them based on Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) library [23] built on the GNU Multiple Precision arithmetic (GMP) library [1]: GMP library provides arbitrary precision arithmetic APIs which are invoked by PBC to support pairing-based cryptosystem. In our application, we use the pairing-friendly elliptic curves ( ) and ( ) with a 512-bit prime. Furthermore, to satisfy the performance requirement, we deploys MNT elliptic curve to implement the ABE system.
In Fig. 5 , we demonstrate these functions' performance when executing them on a control server and a smart meter. We notice that ABE encryption at a server and decryption at a smart meter executes less than 100 ms and 500 ms respectively when the number of attributes is 5 or less. The overall execution time for P3 takes less than 800 ms when the number of attributes is 5. Refer to Appendix D in [17] for detailed overhead for P3. Consequently, P3 system can satisfy the Appliance Control program which accepts up to a few seconds or even minutes' delay. Meanwhile, P3 can be further utilized in delay-tolerance communications in smart grids which satisfy seconds or even hours' delay [27] . Security of the ABE encryption system has already been analyzed in [12] , [6] and we will not discuss it any further.
V. RELATED WORKS
Main privacy preservations approaches in smart grids including battery [13] , [14] , [24] , ID anonymization [10] , disturbance [19] and cryptographic schemes [11] , [15] , [18] , [31] are reviewed. Furthermore, in [22] powerconsumption data under DR are collected and analyzed to deduce occupant's activities in-home.
Battery: some privacy protections use rechargeable battery: G. Kalogridis et al. [14] utilize the electric power routing to run partial power consumption demands off a battery rather than off the power grid directly. G. Kalogridis et al. [13] proposed the ElecPrivacy system to detect ongoing or upcoming privacy threats, reconfigure the power routing and eventually mask load signature for appliances. S. McLaughlin et al. [24] propose the Non-Intrusive Load Leveling (NILL), a new class of algorithms to mask the appliance's power usage signature. However, there is still a small number of event disclosures. Rechargeable batteries cost around $1,000 [24] , demanding installment and maintenance expenses. Furthermore, smart appliances such as dryers, clothes washers, etc. can directly communicate with utility operators. Hence, installing one rechargeable battery cannot totally mask all appliances' load signatures.
Cryptographic Schemes: F. Li et al. [18] focus on smart metering data aggregation protection in which, all messages are encrypted via homomorphic encryption algorithm. F. D. Garcia and B. Jacobs [11] proposed a privacy-friendly protocol by using homomorphic (Paillier) encryption and additive secret sharing. A. Rial and G. Danezis [31] use zero knowledge proofs and commitments to preserve smart meters' privacy. In [15] , K. Kursawe, et al. proposed four different protocols based on DiffieHellman Key-exchange to protect privacy of aggregation. However, no solutions are provided against appliance control privacy leakage.
Anonymity: C. Efthymiou and G. Kalogridis [10] proposed a trusted key escrow service to anonymize frequent readings with pseudonymmous IDs rather than unique identifiers along with randomized time intervals. Nevertheless, anonymity approaches masking customers' identity cannot preserve customers' behavior once the escrow service is compromised.
Disturbance: H. Li et al. [19] proposed a compressed meter reading approach that enhances its privacy through the use of random sequence. But its Access Points (AP) is assumed never to be compromised.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
Appliance control applications are convenient services in smart grids. However, the inferred privacy leakage also raises customers' concerns. Appliance control commands have easily been mined to expose customers' privacy such as absences, appliance ownerships, daily activity models, etc. We propose a privacy preserving protocol to protect the customers' sensitive information through the use of the ABE encryption system. Our experiment results show that its performance is acceptable.
Meanwhile, revoking of invalidate keys for ABE system is a critical component for P3. How to minimize its vulnerable window is the goal for our future research. Moreover, we are going to unravel some pairing-friendly elliptic curves demonstrating the faster decryption process as most subscribers e.g. smart meters are low-end.
